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LIRIANO V. HOBART CORP.: OBVIOUS DANGERS,
THE DUTY TO WARN OF SAFER ALTERNATIVES,
AND THE HEEDING PRESUMPTION*
Hildy Bowbeer & David S. Killorant
INTRODUCTION
In Liriano v. Hobart Corp. ("Liriano III"),' the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that a
worker who lost his hand after inserting it into an operating
meat grinder could sue its manufacturer for failing to warn
him against using the grinder without a protective guard.2
The guard was present at the time the grinder was sold to the
plaintiff's employer, but it had been removed before the acci-
dent.3 Specifically, the Second Circuit ruled that even if the
danger of placing one's hand in a meat grinder was open and
obvious, the manufacturer could be held liable for failing to
place a warning on the machine informing the user that a
"safer alternative," i.e., a guard, was available.4 The court
then held that even if the plaintiff had no direct proof that the
defendant's failure to warn caused his injury, the jury could
infer from the absence of a warning label and the occurrence of
the accident that a label, if present, would have prevented the
' 01999 Hildy Bowbeer and David S. Killoran. All Rights Reserved.
t Hildy Bowbeer is Senior Counsel in the Office of General Counsel, 3M
Company, St. Paul, Minnesota. The views expressed in this Article are hers and
not necessarily those of 3M Company. David S. Killoran is a partner with the San
Francisco, California law firm of Carroll, Burdick & McDonough, LLP. The authors
would also like to thank Christopher Maciejewski of the law firm of Wells,
Anderson & Race, Denver, Colorado, for his valuable assistance in the preparation
of portions of this Article.
1 170 F.3d 264 (2d Cir. 1999) [hereinafter Liriano III].
2 See id. at 267.
3 See id. at 266.
" See id. at 271.
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accident-a theory of causation that effectively shifts the bur-
den to the defendant to prove that a warning would not have
altered the outcome.
The Liriano III decision represents an unfortunate expan-
sion of products liability law regarding the duty to warn and
flies in the face of common sense and safety policy as well as
judicial precedent. As the following discussion will demon-
strate, neither product safety nor respect for the judicial pro-
cess is engendered by decisions that speculate about the effica-
cy, and encourage the proliferation, of warnings about obvious
product hazards.
I. THE LIRLANO III OPINION
A. Factual and Procedural Background
In 1993, Luis Liriano, a seventeen-year-old recent immi-
grant employed in the meat department at a Super Associated
grocery store ("Super"), was injured on the job while feeding
meat into a commercial meat grinder from which his employer
had removed the manufacturer-supplied safety guard. His
hand was caught in the "worm" that grinds the meat, and his
hand and lower forearm were amputated.6
Hobart Corporation ("Hobart") had manufactured and sold
the meat grinder in or before 1961 with a permanently affixed
safety guard that prevented the user's hands from coming into
contact with the grinding "worm."7 It was undisputed that the
grinder as originally manufactured, with the guard in place,
was safe, and that it was very dangerous to operate if the
guard was removed.8 No labels were placed on the machine to
warn against operating it without the safety guard.9 The
S ee id.




See id. Interestingly, while there is no reference in the Second Circuit opin-
ion, it appears from the parties' briefs that the subject grinder did have a warning
label affixed to it when first sold which told users to keep their fingers out of the
mouth of the grinder and to push meat through with a stick or "stomper." That
label, however, was no longer present on the grinder by the time of plaintiffs
accident. It was undisputed that plaintiff was using his fingers, not a "stomper,"
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grinding mechanism inside the grinder was not visible to the
operator, but chunks of meat fed into one hole came out an-
other as ground meat."° In 1962, Hobart began affixing
warnings to new meat grinders admonishing against removal
of the guard." There was also evidence that, in the years af-
ter the grinder was sold and before plaintiff's accident, Hobart
became aware of purchasers who had forcibly removed the
safety guards. 2
It was undisputed that when plaintiff's employer, Super,
acquired the grinder, the safety guard was intact and that
while the grinder was in Super's possession, the guard was
removed. 3 The Second Circuit opinion also reveals that
Liriano had only recently immigrated to the United States
and could not read English. 4 He had been on the job for just
one week, had never received instructions on how to use the
meat grinder, and had used it only two or three times
before his injury. 5  Liriano had, however, worked briefly
with a meat grinder at another supermarket before he was
injured at Super.' 6
Liriano sued Hobart for defective product design and fail-
ure to warn under principles of negligence and strict products
liability in New York state court.'7 Hobart removed the case
to federal court and impleaded Super as a third party defen-
to push meat into the grinder. See Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee at 12, Liriano v.
Hobart Corp., 92 N.Y.2d 232, 700 N.E.2d 303, 677 N.Y.S.2d 764 (1998).
'0 See Liriano III, 170 F.3d at 269.
*' See Liriano I, 132 F.3d at 125.
"See id.
*' See id.; Liriano III, 170 F.3d at 266. While not set forth in the Second Cir-
cult opinion, the parties' briefs to the New York Court of Appeals reveal that the
grinder involved in the accident was sold new not to Super, but to an A&P super-
market. See Brief for Defendant Hobart Corp. at 3, Liriano v. Hobart Corp., 92
N.Y.2d 232, 700 N.E.2d 303, 677 N.Y.S.2d 764 (1998). When it was acquired by
Super many years later, the guard was still intact. In fact, the guard apparently
remained in place on the grinder for more than 30 years when it was removed by
Super just a few weeks before plaintiffs accident. See id. at 4. Moreover, the
guard had been permanently affixed to the grinder by three rivets and could only
be removed by forcibly destroying the rivets. See id. Nothing in the briefs or in
the Second Circuit opinion reveals why the guard was removed.
14 See Liriano III, 170 F.3d at 269.
: See id.
16 See Brief for Appellee at 10, Liriano v. Hobart Corp., 170 F.3d 264 (2d Cir.
1999) (Nos. 96-9641(L), 97-7449).
1" See Liriano I, 132 F.3d at 125.
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dant, seeking indemnification and/or contribution. 8 The dis-
trict court dismissed all of Liriano's claims except those based
on failure to warn. 9 Following trial, the jury concluded that
the manufacturer's failure to warn proximately caused
Liriano's injuries and apportioned liability five percent to
Hobart and ninety-five percent to Super.2" The jury assigned
no fault to Liriano himself, but the trial judge ruled this to be
unreasonable as a matter of law.2 On partial retrial, limited
to the extent of Liriano's responsibility, the jury assigned him
one-third of the responsibility.22
On appeal, Hobart argued that a manufacturer could not
be liable on a failure to warn theory in a case in which the
substantial modification defense would preclude liability for
design defect. Hobart further argued that the facts of the case
precluded liability for failure to warn as a matter of law."'
The Second Circuit certified these questions to the New York
Court of Appeals,' which answered that a manufacturer can
indeed be liable for failure to warn in a case of substantial
modification, but it declined to answer the second question.'
The Second Circuit thereupon issued the opinion that gives
rise to this Article.
B. The Obvious Dangers of Meat Grinders: What the Liriano
III Court Did Not Decide
The Second Circuit, like the New York Court of Appeals on
certification, declined to answer the principal question posed
by the parties on appeal: whether the danger of placing one's
18 See id.
19 See id.
20 See id. at 125-26.
21 See Liriano v. Hobart Corp., No. 94 Civ. 5279, 1996 WL 304337, at *8
(S.D.N.Y. June 6, 1996). During trial, plaintiff testified that he did not remember
the accident, but claimed that he did not intend to put his hand into the grinder
and that the contact was inadvertent. The judge's ruling that plaintiff was contrib-
utorily negligent as a matter of law indicates that the court was convinced that
whether or not Liriano intended to put his hand into the grinder, he could have
avoided the injury by exercising care in its operation. See id.
2 See Liriano I, 132 F.3d at 126.
2' See Liriano III, 170 F.3d 264, 266 (2d Cir. 1999).
24 See Liriano v. Hobart Corp., 92 N.Y.2d 232, 700 N.E.2d 303, 677 N.Y.S.2d
764 (1998) [hereinafter Liriano 11].
2' See id. at 236, 700 N.E.2d at 304, 677 N.Y.S.2d at 765.
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hand in a meat grinder is obvious as a matter of law." In re-
sponse to the same question certified to it, the New York Court
of Appeals refused to answer in part because the 'Second
Circuit's Liriano I opinion did "not indicate that there is an
unsettled or open question of New York substantive law. 27
The Second Circuit, then, acknowledging that the danger
might be obvious, found it unnecessary to answer whether the
danger was obvious as a matter of law because it constructed
an alternate basis for imposing liability-by imposing a duty to
warn even where the danger is obvious.2"
C. The Duty to Warn
1. Duty to Warn About Safer Alternatives
Apparently unable to resolve the question of obviousness
raised by the parties, the Liriano III court instead extended
the law on the duty to warn into unprecedented territory by
ruling that, even if the danger is open and obvious, manufac-
turers may still have a duty to inform the user about safer
alternatives.' Although the court did not cite a single report-
ed decision in support of its expansion of the law, it did cite an
excerpt from a law review article by James A. Henderson and
Aaron D. Twerski:
As two distinguished torts scholars have pointed out, a warning can
do more than exhort its audience to be careful. It can also affect
what activities the people warned choose to engage in. And where
the function of a warning is to assist the reader in making choices,
the value of the warning can lie as much in making known the exis-
tence of alternatives as in communicating the fact that a particular
choice is dangerous. It follows that the duty to warn is not necessar-
ily obviated merely because a danger is clear.
To be more concrete, a warning can convey at least two types
of messages. One states that a particular place, object, or activity is
dangerous. Another explains that people need not risk the danger
26 See Liriano III, 170 F.3d at 271.
Liriano II, 92 N.Y.2d at 243, 700 N.E.2d at 309, 677 N.Y.S.2d at 770.
', See Liriano III, 170 F.3d at 271 ("[Elven if New York would consider the
danger of meat grinders to be obvious as a matter of law, that obviousness does
not substitute for the warning that a jury could, and indeed did, find that Hobart




posed by such a place, object, or activity in order to achieve the
purpose for which they might have taken that risk.31
Then, despite the wealth of available reported decisions
around the country on the issue of open and obvious dan-
gers,3 ' the court analogized the facts before it not to another
case, but to a hypothetical "steep grade" road warning:
[A] highway sign that says "Danger-Steep Grade" says less than a
sign that says "Steep Grade Ahead-Follow Suggested Detour to
Avoid Dangerous Areas."
If the hills or mountains responsible for the steep grade are
plainly visible, the first sign merely states what a reasonable person
would know without having to be warned. The second sign tells
drivers what they might not have otherwise known: that there is
another road that is flatter and less hazardous .... Accordingly, a
certain level of obviousness as to the grade of a road might, in prin-
ciple, eliminate the reason for posting a sign of the first variety. But
no matter how patently steep the road, the second kind of sign
might still have a beneficial effect. As a result, the duty to post a
sign of the second variety may persist ....
One who grinds meat, like one who drives on a steep road, can
benefit not only from being told that his activity is dangerous but
from being told of a safer way.32
Bolstered by this analogy, the court concluded that obviousness
does not necessarily preclude liability for failure to warn as a
matter of law. Stepping around the issue of whether the dan-
gers associated with meat grinders are obvious as a matter of
law in New York, the court held that a jury could impose on
product manufacturers a duty to warn of obvious risks.
A jury could reasonably find that there exist people who are em-
ployed as meat grinders and who do not know (a) that it is feasible
to reduce the risk with safety guards, (b) that such guards are made
available with the grinders, and (c) that the grinders should be used
only with the guards. Moreover, a jury can also reasonably find that
30 Id. at 270 (citing James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Doctrinal
Collapse in Products Liability: The Empty Shell of Failure to Warn, 65 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 265, 285 (1990)). However, the excerpt from the Henderson and Twerski
article which the court used as a springboard for its theory did not espouse a
duty to warn about alternatives to obvious risks, but rather observed that under
certain limited circumstances, there might be a duty to warn of non-obvious risks
that could only be avoided by declining to use the product altogether-the so-called
"informed choice" warning that appears most frequently in the pharmaceutical
context. See infra notes 120-127 and accompanying text.
31 See infra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
32 Liriano III, 170 F.3d at 270.
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there are enough such people, and that warning them is sufficiently
inexpensive, that a reasonable manufacturer would inform them
that safety guards exist and that the grinder is meant to be used
only with such guards. Thus, even if New York would consider the
danger of meat grinders to be obvious as a matter of law, that obvi-
ousness does not substitute for the warning that a jury could, and
indeed did, find that Hobart had a duty to provide.3
2. The Court's Theory of Causation
The Second Circuit then turned its attention to the issue
of whether Hobart's failure to provide such a warning had
caused the plaintiff's injury. Hobart argued that plaintiff failed
to present any evidence that its "failure to place a warning on
the machine was causally related to his injury."' The defense
further asserted that there was no basis to conclude either that
plaintiff would have "refused to grind meat had the machine
borne a warning or that a warning would have persuaded [the
employer] not to [permit] its employees [to] use the grinder
without the safety attachment."35 The Second Circuit rejected
this argument and ruled that, "after [the plaintiff] had shown
that Hobart's wrong greatly increased the likelihood of the
harm that occurred," plaintiff had no burden to "introduce
additional evidence showing that the failure to warn was a
but-for cause of his injury."" The court explained:
When a defendant's negligent act is deemed wrongful precisely be-
cause it has a strong propensity to cause the type of injury that
ensued, that very causal tendency is evidence enough to establish a
prima facie case of cause-in-fact. The burden then shifts to the de-
fendant to come forward with evidence that its negligence was not
such a but-for cause. 7
In support of this ruling, the court analogized the case to
Martin v. Herzog," in which a buggy driver argued that plain-
tiff had failed to prove the defendant's negligence in driving
without lights was the cause-in-fact of the accident. Judge
33 Id. at 271.
" Id. (citations omitted).
3Id.
36 Id.
" Liriano III, 170 F.3d at 271 (citing Zuchowicz v. United States, 140 F.3d
381, 388 nn.6-7, 390-91 (2d Cir. 1998)).
3, 228 N.Y. 164, 170, 126 N.E. 814, 816 (1920) (Cardozo, J.).
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Cardozo rejected defendant's argument, noting that the "legis-
lature deemed driving without lights after sundown to be neg-
ligent precisely because not using lights tended to cause acci-
dents of [this] sort."3' Thus, the fact of the accident combined
with defendant's conduct was deemed to create a rebuttable
inference of but-for causation of the plaintiff's injury.0 The
Second Circuit in Liriano III found the Martin defendant's
failure to use lights analogous to Hobart's failure to warn.4'
Plaintiff's "prima facie case," the court found, "arose from the
strong causal linkage between Hobart's [failure to warn] and
the harm that occurred." 2 Finding that Hobart had failed to
rebut the prima facie case, the court held that plaintiff's had
proven causation.
The court did not discuss, however, the extent to which
any of the specific circumstances in the instant case might
undermine the appropriateness of applying the inference of
causation propounded by Judge Cardozo in Martin. For exam-
ple, the court refused to consider the effect on causation of the
obviousness of the danger of placing one's hand in a meat
grinder, the plaintiff's inability to read English, the fact that
another warning label that had been sold on the equipment
had been lost by the time of the accident, the special circum-
stances of the employment context, or the difference in the
nature and extent of the response that would have been re-
quired to avoid the injury.43
The net result of the Liriano III decision, therefore, was to
impose a strange new duty on manufacturers: the duty to warn
that when any product safety feature is removed or defeated,
resulting in obvious danger to the user, the product would be
3- See id. at 168, 126 N.E. at 815 (emphasis added).
40 See id. at 169, 126 N.E. at 816.
" See Liriano III, 170 F.3d at 272.
42 Id.
' Interestingly, the court also did not discuss any of the numerous reported
decisions that address the so-called "heeding presumption," even though its ap-
proach to burden-shifting on causation reflected a similar analytical leap. The
"heeding presumption" is a device adopted by some courts to shift the burden of
production on certain elements of the issue of causation in a failure to warn case
from the plaintiff to the defendant. The presumption is that if an adequate warn-
ing had been provided by the defendant, it would have been read and heeded;
therefore, the plaintiff need not produce independent evidence that he would have
done so. See infra notes 130-153 and accompanying text (discussing the question-
able foundation for this presumption).
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safer with the safety feature. Moreover, the jury may assume
without any evidence that such warnings would be effective
generally, and would have prevented the plaintiffs accident in
particular." As the following discussion will describe, both
the imposition of a duty and the leap to causation are contrary
to basic principles of the judicial decision-making process,
established case law, and sound safety policy.
II. DISCUSSION
A. The Court Allowed the Jury to Impose a Legal Duty
The Liriano III court's holding that "obviousness does not
substitute for the warning that a jury could, and indeed did,
find that Hobart had a duty to provide," typifies its flawed
reasoning."5 Virtually all courts agree that while a judge must
leave questions of fact to the jury, he or she must not permit a
jury to speculate on the existence of a duty.46 In fact, "[one of
the basic principles of trial by jury is that the judge determines
the applicable law and the jury determines the facts."'7 There-
fore, by allowing the jury to find that Hobart had a duty to
warn, the court approved the violation of this basic principle.
There is strong support in both the common law and legal
scholarship that the question of whether or not a duty exists is
for the judge, not the jury, to determine. The New York Court
of Appeals has held that "[ulnlike foreseeability and causation,
which are issues generally and more suitably entrusted to fact
finder adjudication, the definition of the existence and scope of
an alleged tortfeasor's duty is usually a legal, policy-laden
declaration reserved for Judges .... .'4 As Prosser and Keeton
explain: "[I]t should be recognized that 'duty' is not sacrosanct
in itself, but is only an expression of the sum total of those
4" See Liriano III, 170 F.3d at 271.
id.
" See Pinto v. Mr. Softee of N.Y. Inc., 22 A.D.2d 874, 874, 254 N.Y.S.2d 683,
684 (1st Dep't 1964) ("T]he Trial Judge should not have permitted the jury to
speculate on the existence of any such duty.").
4' Robinson v. Sanchez, 168 Misc. 2d 546, 547, 639 N.Y.S.2d 897, 899 (Sup. Ct.
Bronx County 1996).
" Palka v. Servicemaster Management Servs. Corp., 83 N.Y.2d 579, 585, 634
N.E.2d 189, 192, 611 N.Y.S.2d 817, 820 (1994).
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considerations of policy which lead the law to say that the
plaintiff is entitled to protection." 9 More specifically, they
note, "[ilt is no part of the province of a jury to decide whether
a manufacturer of goods is under any obligation for the safety
of the ultimate consumer.""
A jury is charged to hear and weigh the evidence, but it
hears nothing of the policy considerations involved in a ques-
tion of duty and is therefore ill-equipped to decide whether a
duty exists. Accordingly, it is wrong for a judge to permit a
fact-finding jury to decide a question of duty. When the Liriano
III court held that "a jury could, and indeed did, find that
Hobart had a duty to provide" a warning,5' the court allowed
a jury to invade the province of the judge, and a question of
duty was thus decided by jurors uninformed of, and ratified by
a court seemingly unconcerned with, the important issues of
policy that limit a manufacturer's duty to warn in cases where
plaintiffs are injured by obvious dangers.
B. The Court Should Have Addressed Policy Issues Relating to
the Obviousness Doctrine and the Duty to Warn
1. The Obviousness Doctrine and its Rationale
In an overwhelming majority of jurisdictions, manufactur-
ers owe no duty to warn of product-related risks that are obvi-
ous to reasonable users.5" Courts across the country acknowl-
edge the futility of imposing a duty to warn in cases of open
and obvious dangers.5' Premised on this recognition that
49 W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 53,
at 358 (5th ed. 1984).
'9 Id. § 37, at 236.
', Liriano III, 170 F.3d 264, 271 (2d Cir. 1999).
, See Kerr v. Koemm, 557 F. Supp. 284, 287 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 1983)
([O]bviousness relieves the manufacturer of a duty to inform users of a danger.").
' See, e.g., Argubright v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 868 F.2d 764, 766 (5th Cir.
1989); Fanning v. LeMay, 230 N.E.2d 182, 185 (Ill. 1967); Duncan v. Louisiana
Power & Light Co., 532 So. 2d 968, 971 (La. Ct. App. 1988); Bell v. Wysong &
Miles Co., 531 N.E.2d 267, 269 (Mass. App. Ct. 1988); Nabkey v. Jack Loeks En-
ters., Inc., 137 N.W.2d 132, 134 (Mich. 1965); Dempsey v. Virginia Dare Stores,
186 S.W.2d 217, 220 (Mo. Ct. App. 1945); Ruggiero v. Max Braun & Sons, Inc.,
141 A.D.2d 528, 529-30, 529 N.Y.S.2d 144, 146 (2d Dep't 1988); Berry v. Eckhardt
Porsche Audi, Inc., 578 P.2d 1195, 1196 (Okla. 1978); Pemberton v. American
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warnings serve no purpose when the dangers are apparent, the
"open and obvious rule" is not only embedded in the common
law of many states, but it has also been adopted by statute in
several others.' In fact, the New York Court of Appeals, in
its opinion on the question certified to it by the Second Circuit,
held that there is no duty to warn of hazards that are patently
dangerous, pose open and obvious risks, or are readily appar-
ent as a matter of common sense. "Put differently, when a
warning would have added nothing to the user's appreciation
of the danger, no duty to warn exists as no benefit would be
Distilled Spirits Co., 664 S.W.2d 690 (Tenn. 1984); American Tobacco Co. v.
Grinell, 951 S.W.2d 420 (Tex. 1997); Menard v. Newhall, 373 A.2d 505 (Vt.
1977).
"' See R.D. Hursh, Annotation, Manufacturer's or Seller's Duty to Give Warning
Regarding Product as Affecting His Liability for Product-Caused Injury, 76
A.L.R.2d 9, § 9 (1961) (jurisdictions adhering to the view that there is no duty to
warn of open and obvious dangers); see also 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-2106(c)
(West 1999) ([A] defendant shall not be liable for failure to warn of material risks
that were obvious to a reasonably prudent product user and material risks that
were a matter of common knowledge to persons in the same position as or similar
positions to that of the plaintiff in a product liability action."); Maneely v. General
Motors Corp., 108 F.3d 1176, 1179 (9th Cir. 1997); Lamb v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
1 F.3d 1184 (11th Cir. 1993) (danger of drowning in swimming pool is apparent,
open danger, commonly known to all, including a nine-year-old boy, open and
obvious danger constitutes absolute legal defense in failure to warn cases); Kerr,
557 F. Supp. at 287 n.1 ("Obviousness should not relieve manufacturers of the
duty to eliminate dangers from their design if that can reasonably be done, but
obviousness relieves the manufacturer of a duty to inform users of a danger.");
Auburn Mach. Works Co. v. Jones, 366 So. 2d 1167 (Fla. 1979); Knox v. Delta
Int'l Mach. Corp., 554 So. 2d 6, 7 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) ("[A] manufacturer
has no duty to warn consumers of ... an obvious danger."); Gragg v. Diebold,
Inc., 403 S.E.2d 229 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991) (summary judgment proper when absence
of warning light on bank security system was open and obvious); National Bank of
Bloomington v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 600 N.E.2d 1275 (Ill. App. 1992) (no
duty to warn that hot water can scald or burn skin); Colter v. Barber-Greene Co.,
525 N.E.2d 1305, 1312 (Mass. 1988); Glittenberg v. Doughboy Recreational Indus.,
491 N.W.2d 208 (Mich. 1992) (no duty to warn in negligence case involving simple
product; dangers associated with diving into shallow water in an above ground
swimming pool open and obvious); Holm v. Sponco Mfg. Inc., 324 N.W.2d 207
(Minn. 1982); Mix v. MTD Prods., Inc., 393 N.W.2d 18, 19 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986)
(stating that "a manufacturer of a product has no duty to warn of dangers that
are obvious to anyone using the product"); Micallef v. Miehle Co., 39 N.Y.2d 376,
348 N.E.2d 571, 384 N.Y.S.2d 115 (1976); Caterpillar, Inc. v. Shears, 911 S.W.2d
379, 382 (Tex. 1995) ("The fact that a risk is readily apparent serves the same
function as a warning."); Jerry S. Phillips, Products Liability: Obviousness of Dan-
ger Revisited, 15 IND. L. REV. 793 (1982).
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gained by requiring a warning."55 The rule has drawn further
support from the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products
Liability:
Warnings: obvious and generally known risks. In general, a product
seller is not subject to liability for failing to warn or instruct regard-
ing risks and risk-avoidance measures that should be obvious to, or
generally known by, foreseeable product users. When a risk is obvi-
ous or generally known, the prospective addressee of a warning will
or should already know of its existence. Warning of an obvious or
generally known risk in most instances will not provide an effective
additional measure of safety. Furthermore, warnings that deal with
obvious or generally known risks may be ignored by users and con-
sumers and may diminish the significance of warnings about non-
obvious, not-generally-known risks. Thus, requiring warnings of
obvious or generally known risks could reduce the efficacy of warn-
ings generally. 6
An extensive discussion of the open and obvious doctrine
and its rationale appears in the Michigan Supreme Court's
decision in Glittenberg v. Doughboy Recreational Industries.57
Acknowledging the real-world effects of imposing legal duties,
Glittenberg noted that there must be limits on a
manufacturer's duty to warn, for "if there were an obligation to
warn against all injuries that conceivably might result from
the use or misuse of a product, manufacturers would find it
practically impossible to market their goods."8 Moreover, the
court noted, warnings of obvious dangers are purposeless.
Warnings serve "[to] protect consumers where the manufactur-
er or seller has superior knowledge of the products' dangerous
characteristics and those to whom the warning would be di-
rected would be ignorant of the facts that a warning would
communicate."59 If, however, the risks are obvious, then "the
consumer is in just as good a position as the manufacturer to
gauge the dangers associated with the product.' ° A warning
about such dangers, therefore, adds nothing. The Glittenberg
Is Liriano II, 92 N.Y.2d 232, 242, 700 N.E.2d 303, 308, 677 N.Y.S.2d 768, 769
(1998).
56 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCT LIABILITY § 2 cmt. j (1997) [here-
inafter RESTATEMENT].
617 491 N.W.2d 208 (Mich. 1992).
Is Id. at 212 (citation omitted).
19 Id. at 213.
60 Id.
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court also observed that its refusal to impose a duty to warn of
obvious dangers "is consistent with the approach used by a
vast majority of the jurisdictions in their negligent failure to
warn cases."
61
In Caterpillar, Inc. v. Shears,62 for example, the Texas
Supreme Court overturned a Texas Court of Appeals decision
which held that the dangers of operating a front-end loader
without a rollover protective structure ("ROPS") were not so
open and obvious as to negate any duty to warn.' The su-
preme court held that a manufacturer had no duty to warn of
the dangers of operating a front-end loader without a ROPS;
an average person looking at an open cab of an 18,000 pound
loader without its protective equipment would understand that
nothing stands in the way of intrusion from rear or above.6
As Justice Kennedy's dissent from the court of appeals opinion
had observed:
The policy for requiring manufacturers to inform users of the risks
inhering in their products is based upon the sound policy that the
user is entitled to the information necessary to make an intelligent
choice about whether the produces utility or benefits justify expos-
ing himself to the risk of harm .... I conclude that the danger of
collision and injury when operating a front-end loader without a
ROPS is obvious as a matter of law. I conclude that the judgment
61 Id. at 214 n.15 (citations omitted). The court stated:
In the failure to warn context, the obvious nature of the simple product's
potential danger serves the core purpose of the claim, i.e., it functions as
an inherent warning that the risk is present. Stated otherwise, if the
risk is obvious from the characteristics of the product, the product itself
telegraphs the precise warning that plaintiffs complain is lacking.
.. "Reduced to its simplest terms, the obvious danger rule in the
context of a warning with regard to a simple product is both fair and
logical. Where a warning is not needed because the product's potentially
dangerous condition (and the consequences of ignoring that condition) is
fully evident, providing a warning does not serve to make the product
safer.
Glittenberg, 491 N.W.2d at 215 (citations omitted).
2 Caterpillar, Inc. v. Shears, 911 S.W.2d 379 (Tax. 1995), overruling Caterpil-
lar, Inc. v. Shears, 881 S.W.2d 923 (Tax. App. 1994).
See Shears, 881 S.W.2d at 936.
See Shears, 911 S.W.2d at 382-83.
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against Caterpillar based upon the failure to warn of the danger
of collision and possibility of operator injury when the ROPS
is removed based upon strict liability or negligence should be
reversed. 5
Moreover, courts have applied this doctrine even in cases
where the obvious risk threatens serious bodily harm. For
example, in Maneely v. General Motors Corp.," the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit declared that
there could be no liability for failing to warn passengers
against the open and obvious dangers of riding unrestrained in
the bed of a pickup truck, despite their potential seriousness.
The manifest danger to which all of this is addressed is being eject-
ed from the vehicle during a crash or being slammed against an
unforgiving hard surface of the vehicle itself. From all of this, we
conclude that the dangers of riding unrestrained in a moving motor
vehicle have become common knowledge and are firmly engraved
upon the public consciousness.'
The rationales discussed in Glittenberg and Shears are
also viewed favorably by scholars, and the Second Circuit's
rejection of them is unfounded. In fact, the passage from the
Henderson and Twerski article quoted in support of the newly-
minted Liriano duty to warn 68 does not, contrary to the
Liriano III court's interpretation of it, address obvious, un-
avoidable risks at all. Rather, the authors observe that latent,
unavoidable risks may, in special circumstances limited pri-
marily to toxic agents and pharmaceuticals, trigger a duty to
inform potential users of those risks, so that the users can
decide in light of the risks and benefits (and often with the
assistance of a learned intermediary such as a health care
provider) whether to use the product at all. When it comes to
warnings about obvious risks, however, the authors' position
leaves no room for confusion: "[Aissuming that some risks are
patently obvious, the obviousness of a product-related risk
invariably serves the same function as a warning that the risk
is present. Thus, nothing is to be gained by adding a warning
of the danger already telegraphed by the product itself."69
Shears, 881 S.W.2d at 936 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
108 F.3d 1176 (9th Cir. 1997).
67 Id. at 1180.
"" See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
69 James A. Henderson & Aaron D. Twerski, Doctrinal Collapse in Products
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2. Policies Underlying the Obviousness Doctrine
Courts and commentators alike have articulated a number
of policies at work in determining whether there should be a
duty to warn of open and obvious dangers. Even if the emo-
tionally compelling facts of a particular case suggest that there
may have been some minute benefit in offering further warn-
ings about an obvious danger, the policies that guide the over-
all development of the law in this area must not be sacrificed
to the desire to find a remedy for a tragic injury. The Liriano
III court should have considered these policies before imposing
any duty to warn or allowing a jury to impose such a duty.
a. The Policy of Preventing Future Harm Is Not Ad-
vanced by Imposing a Duty to Warn a Person Who
Is Unaware of an Obvious Danger
Undeniably, products liability law seeks to encourage the
use of product designs and warnings that will reduce the risk
of future harm.70 The goal of preventing future harm is not
advanced, however, by imposing a duty to warn a person who
is oblivious to an obvious danger. In Pineda v. Ennabe,71 for
example, a small child fell out the second story window of her
apartment. The child's mother had placed a bed directly under
the window. Plaintiff, playing without adult supervision,
bounced on the bed, knocked the window screen out or aside,
and fell 30 feet to the ground. 2 Plaintiff claimed the landlord
should have placed a warning label on or near the window
advising tenants the screen would not keep a person from
falling out.73 The court reasoned that "[tihe policy of prevent-
ing future harm would not likely be significantly advanced by
imposing a duty here. A parent oblivious to the obvious danger
posed by an unsupervised child near an open upper story win-
Liability. The Empty Shell of Failure to Warn, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 265, 282 (1990).
'* On the other hand, the courts have uniformly held that the manufacturer is
not an "insurer" of the safety of users of its products, and does not have a duty
to produce only products that represent the "ultimate" in safety, but rather prod-
ucts that are "reasonably safe." See infra notes 86-89 and accompanying text.
" 61 Cal. App. 4th 1403 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998).




dow would likely be equally oblivious to the warning."7 4
Therefore, the court concluded, the landlord "owed no duty of
care to prevent the kind of accident which occurred here."5
Similarly, the Liriano III court should have considered
whether the policy of preventing future harm would have been
significantly advanced by imposing a duty to warn of an obvi-
ous danger. The plaintiff in Liriano ignored the obvious danger
of placing his hand in an operating meat grinder. Therefore,
even if advising users of a safer alternative could theoretically
prevent some injuries, the circumstances of this case make the
efficacy of an additional warning speculative at best.
This issue points out another of the fundamental flaws in
the process followed by the Liriano III court: the willingness to
take for granted that the warning it proposed would in fact
make the product (or, in the steep grade analogy, the road)
safer. One of the most thoughtful analyses of this issue can be
found in Meyerhoff v. Michelin Tire Corp.76 In that case, the
plaintiffs' decedent had been killed when a tire he was inflat-
ing exploded. The plaintiffs sued the tire manufacturer for
negligent failure to warn.7" After trial and a verdict for the
plaintiffs, the district court granted judgment as a matter of
law in favor of Michelin, which the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed.' The district court excluded plaintiffs' ex-
pert testimony under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
Inc.,79 because it lacked a sufficient foundation to prove the
proposed warning's feasibility, adequacy, and effectiveness.'
The court then found that in the absence of such evidence,
plaintiff could not prevail on his claim that there was a duty to
warn:
"To prove defective design, it is insufficient merely to assert that a
different design would have alleviated or averted the plaintiffs inju-
ries, since it may be assumed that any particular accident involving
man and machine might have been avoided through a variation in
74 Id.
71 Id. at 1408.
76 852 F. Supp. 933 (D. Kan. 1994), affd, 70 F.3d 1175 (10th Cir. 1995).
7 See id. at 936.
71 See Meyerhoff v. Michelin Tire Corp., 70 F.3d 1175 (10th Cir. 1995).
79 509 U.S. 579, 589-90 (1993).
' See Meyerhoff, 852 F. Supp. at 947.
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the design of the machine. However, such a variation might greatly
magnify the chances of other sorts of mishaps taking place.. .. "
Similarly, in a warning case, a plaintiff must do more than
simply present an expert who espouses a new or different warning.
He must establish that warning's feasibility, adequacy, and effective-
ness .... The Supreme Court stated in Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, -, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 2793, 125
L.Ed.2d 469 (1993):
The subject of the experts' testimony must be 'scientific...
knowledge.' The adjective 'scientific' implies a grounding in
the methods and procedures of science. Similarly, the word
'knowledge' connotes more than subjective belief or unsup-
ported speculation."1
The court's reasoning in Meyerhoff is compelling. Apart
from whether there should ever be a duty to provide a warning
about an obvious danger, it makes no sense from either the
legal or public policy perspective to impose a duty to provide
such a warning where no one has offered competent proof
that the warning would have been effective to make the
product safer. Nevertheless, that is precisely what happened
in Liriano.
Furthermore, research in the human factors field has
called into question whether the effectiveness of a proposed
warning on users generally or on the plaintiff in particular can
ordinarily be appraised through subjective assessment and
intuition alone, whether that assessment is made by a panel of
jurors or a single judge. 2 In one study, researchers asked
SI Id. (first citation omitted) (omissions in original).
" See T. Ayres et al., Do Subjective Ratings Predict Warning Effectiveness?
(Human Factors Soc'y 34th Annual Meeting) (on file with authors); A. Dorris,
Product Warnings in Theory and Practice: Some Questions Answered and Some An-
swers Questioned, PROC. OF THE HUMAN FACTORS Socy 35TH ANNUAL MEETING
1073, 1074 (1991) ("[Tihere is a tendency for people to respond with what they be-
lieve to be the 'correct' or 'expected' answer. The available research does not dem-
onstrate that the responses of subjects in experiments of this type [studying the
relationship between various message variables and the preferences, expectations,
and stated responses of test participants] have consistent predictive value with
respect to actual behavior."); J. Frantz & J. Miller, Communicating a Safety-Criti-
cal Limitation of an Infant-Carrying Product: The Effect of Product Design and
Warning Salience, INT'L J. INDUS. ERGONOMICS 1, 10-11 (1993) ("The nonintuitive
nature of our findings regarding warning salience provides additional evidence that
proposed warning solutions need to be evaluated in some manner beyond subjec-
tive impressions as to how they will perform .... Just as it is important to
evaluate the physical design of a product along such dimensions as strength, reli-
ability, and durability, it is important to evaluate proposed warnings along rele-
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three panels of laypersons (law students, engineering students,
and shoppers at a local mall) to rate subjectively the compara-
tive effectiveness of two warning label designs for a caustic
drain cleaner. Their predictions were compared with the re-
sults of a previous study in which the actual effectiveness of
the two labels was measured in a group of college students.
Less than one-half of the engineering students, only one-third
of the law students, and only 17 percent of the shoppers cor-
rectly identified the more effective of the two designs. In addi-
tion, the engineering students were asked to predict the likeli-
hood that college students such as themselves would read and
comply with the precautions set forth on the labels. The pre-
dicted compliance rates did not match the observed compliance
rates in the earlier study-the predicted rates overstated actual
compliance for one label, and understated actual compliance
for the other. Summing up, the authors observed:
This research does not support Hardie's (1992) position that juries
are capable of determining the effectiveness of a warning unaided by
well-founded expert assistance. Specifically, this study does not
support the assertion that the "knowledge of ordinary people" is
sufficient to (1) distinguish between warnings that differ in their
behavioral effectiveness and (2) accurately predict the likelihood
that people such as themselves will read and heed safety in-
structions when using a product.
The authors then commented on the implications of these
findings for a trial in which the label design chosen by the
vant dimensions such as attractiveness, comprehensibility, memorability, and be-
havioral effectiveness."); P. Frantz et al., The Ability of Three Lay Groups to Judge
Product Warning Effectiveness, 1995 Prod. Safety and Liab. Rep. [BNA 494 (Anal-
ysis and Perspective) (citing research results indicating that subjective assessment
of warning effectiveness did not predict actual effectiveness among product users,
and taking issue with view that jurors can accurately assess the effectiveness of
product warnings without assistance from well-founded expert testimony); G. Mc-
Carthy et al., Measured Impact of a Mandated Warning on User Behavior, PROC.
OF THE HuMAN FACTORS Socy 31ST ANNUAL MEETING 479, 483 (1987) ("The study
also demonstrated that subjective opinions on the quality of labels may not be a
valid predictor of the impact of the labels on user behavior, even when the opin-
ions are drawn from persons who have failed to follow the instructions correctly
and have had their errors pointed out to them before the opinions are solicited.").
But see W. Hardie, Can Experts Evaluate the Effectiveness of Warnings?, FOR THE
DEFENSE, Oct. 1991, at 14-21; W. Hardie, Critical Analysis of On-Product Warning
Theory, 1994 Prod. Safety and Liab. Rep. [BNA] 145 (Analysis and Perspective); D.
Houser & R. Clark, Human Factors Testimony: Does the Jury Really Need It?, FOR
THE DEFENSE, May 1993, at 13-19.
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drain cleaner manufacturer was at issue: "In such a situation,
the 'common sense, fairness, and the knowledge of ordinary
people' upon which Hardie suggests relying would likely cause
a jury to reach the incorrect conclusion that the warning was
inadequate and that the safety instructions could and should
have been made more prominent.... "'
Whether or not it is possible in particular cases for a
factf nder to subjectively, and accurately, assess the effective-
ness of a plaintiffs proposed warning, the research findings
described above cast serious doubt on the wisdom of a court's
decision to significantly expand the duty to warn based on
nothing more than an analogy to an invented set of facts and
its own subjective appraisal of the value of a warning under
those circumstances.
b. The Policy of Encouraging People to Take Reason-
able Care for Their Own Safety Is Not Advanced by
Imposing a Duty to Warn of Obvious Risks at the
Expense of Attention to Warnings of Latent Risks
While products liability law is intended to encourage man-
ufacturers to design and label products in such a way as to
promote their safe use, tort law in general is premised on the
policy of encouraging individuals to take reasonable Care for
their own safety and that of those around them.
As the Michigan Supreme Court has recently explained: Under ordi-
nary circumstances, the overriding public policy of encouraging peo-
ple to take reasonable care for their own safety precludes imposing a
duty on the possessor of land to make ordinary [conditions] "fool-
proof." Accordingly, the general duty to protect or warn about known
or obvious dangers is triggered only where some "special aspect" of
the allegedly dangerous condition, such as its "character, location, or
surrounding conditions," indicates that the risk of harm was unrea-
sonable. Otherwise, the invitor is relieved of its duty toward an invi-
tee who is aware of the danger."
The only "special aspect" of the meat grinder in Liriano
was that its permanently affixed guard had been sawed off by
the plaintiffs employer. The jury obviously considered this in
" Frantz et al., supra note 82, at 500.
, Schollenberger v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 925 F. Supp. 1239, 1243 (E.D. Mich.
1996) (citations omitted) (alteration in original).
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assigning Hobart only five percent responsibility for the acci-
dent. However, before letting the jury decide the issue, *the
court should have considered whether the goal of encouraging
people to take reasonable care for their own safety would be
advanced by requiring manufacturers to warn not only of those
dangers that reasonable persons would not have appreciated,
but also of those which reasonable persons, unprompted, would
have seen, understood, and taken steps to avoid. In fact, as
will be discussed below, there is a significant risk that the
proliferation of such warnings would not only fail to improve
the lot of those who deliberately or negligently encounter obvi-
ous dangers, but would, by diluting the user's attention, make
it less likely that other warnings of latent hazards would be
efficacious in assisting reasonable people to notice and avoid
them." The end result would very likely run counter to every-
thing the law of torts and products liability seek to accomplish.
c. Liability Under the Liriano HI Decision Would
Make Manufacturers Insurers and Would Make it
Virtually Impossible for Manufacturers to Make
Rational, Safety-Optimizing Decisions About Which
Warnings to Include
A manufacturer "is not an insurer and its product need not
be accident proof."6 In fact, the New York Court of Appeals
noted, in Bocre Leasing Corp. v. General Motors Corp.:87
"Transforming manufacturers into insurers, with the empty
promise that they can guarantee perpetual and total public
safety, by making them liable in tort for all commercial set-
backs and adversities is not prudent or sound tort public poli-
cy. "88 However, imposing liability for failing to warn about
obvious dangers effectively casts manufacturers in the role of
insurers of their products. As the Ohio Court of Appeals has
said: "To impose a duty upon manufacturers and sellers to...
safeguard against obvious dangers, would in effect make them
insurers of their product. Such a rule would also be so broad-
85 See infra notes 92-111 and accompanying text.
86 Caprara v. Chrysler Corp., 52 N.Y.2d 114, 123-24, 417 N.E.2d 545, 550, 436
N.Y.S.2d 251, 255 (1981).
8 84 N.Y.2d 685, 645 N.E.2d 1195, 621 N.Y.S.2d 497 (1995).
" Id. at 694, 645 N.E.2d at 1199, 621 N.Y.S.2d at 501.
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ranging as to amount to judicial legislation, which is not a
function of this court." 9
In Liriano III, the court should have considered the far-
reaching effects of imposing a virtually limitless duty to warn
of alternatives in the face of an open and obvious danger. Cer-
tainly, consideration of this particular consequence and its
effect on other manufacturers in other situations was not with-
in the purview of the Liriano jury. And, while Judge Newman's
concurring opinion suggests that the effect of the decision
should be limited only to the facts of the case," it is not possi-
ble to read the majority decision without understanding that,
in the Second Circuit's view, a duty to warn can be established
merely by alleging that the user of any product should have
been advised of alternatives to using that product in an openly
dangerous fashion.
The fallacies of the Second Circuit's analysis become evi-
dent when one considers its ramifications for meat grinder
manufacturers alone. First, any grinder manufacturer would
have to conclude from this opinion that it should provide an
on-product warning capable of informing even uneducated,
inexperienced, non-English speaking users about the existence
of every machine part that is capable of being removed (howev-
er forcibly) and the safety consequences (however obvious) of
its absence. And, in formulating the list of items to be ad-
dressed, the manufacturer can take no comfort in having per-
manently affixed a part in such a way that the machine must
be partially destroyed to remove it-if the part can be sawed,
hammered, or chiseled off, it is a candidate for inclusion in the
list. Indeed, by the same rationale, the Liriano duty to warn
should be extended to cover not only the removal but the po-
tential modification of machine parts that could have safety
consequences. Alteration as a result of accidental damage or
lack of maintenance should also be included.
In preparing this warning list, the manufacturer will most
likely find that it is not sufficient simply to name the part,
" Koepke v. Crosman Arms Co., 582 N.E.2d 1000, 1001 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989);
see also Glittenberg v. Doughboy Recreational Indus., 491 N.W.2d 208, 212 n.8
(Mich. 1992) (recognizing that product manufacturers and sellers are not insurers
and so are not "absolutely liable for any and all injuries sustained from the use
of [their] products") (citations omitted).
" See Liriano III, 170 F.3d 264, 275 (2d Cir. 1999) (Newman, J., concurring).
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because the user might not recognize the part by name, or be
able to detect whether it had been removed or modified. Thus,
to implement the goal apparently sought by the Liriano III
court, the manufacturer must assume a duty to educate the
user about the original configuration of the machine, how to
recognize each piece of original equipment, and how to detect
every modification that might affect his safety. It must then
inform the user of the safety consequences of those modifica-
tions and, ultimately, motivate the user (who, we must as-
sume, would not have been motivated by even obvious dangers)
to demand from his employer a product that has not been so
modified. All of this would have to be accomplished by use of
on-product labels. In the end, the manufacturer may well de-
vote more surface space and reader attention (both precious
and limited resources) to the description of risks associated
with the product it did not sell (i.e., the modified or dismem-
bered product) than with the product it did sell.
Consider, for example, the protective guard on the meat
grinder in Liriano. It seems easy enough for the court to sug-
gest a warning indicating that a guard is available and that
the machine should only be used with the guard in place. Even
if the user knows what is meant by a guard and could tell
whether it was missing, what if the guard was not removed,
but instead modified by enlarging the holes to accommodate a
larger "stomper"? The warning that focuses solely on the pres-
ence of the guard rather than its performance characteristics
might well lead to a false sense of security. Thus, the warning
would have to caution against using the product with the
guard removed or modified. But, the question arises: How will
the user recognize whether the guard is in its original condi-
tion? Will the warning need to include a picture? A set of di-
mensions and specifications? Should calipers and T-square be
attached? What if it is not the guard that is modified, but the
cylinder that is replaced, altering the interaction between the
guard and the cylinder and compromising the effectiveness of
the guard? The warning must therefore teach the user how to
detect modification not only of the guard, but of the body of the
grinder as well.
Placement of such a warning would also present practical
issues. One might well argue that it should be placed on the
guard itself, to maximize the chances that the employer will
[Vol. 65:3
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see it and be persuaded to leave the guard intact (although the
manufacturer must certainly have hoped to accomplish this by
permanently affixing the guard to the grinder). On the other
hand, if the guard is nevertheless removed, the label would
necessarily go with it, defeating the ability of the warning to
serve the purpose envisioned by the Liriano III court. What if
the warning is attached to another part of the machine that
itself is subsequently modified or replaced? For that matter,
is it not even foreseeable that warning labels themselves will
be removed?9 Following the analysis of the Liriano III court
to its natural conclusion would suggest the need for a label
informing the user that the grinder was originally sold with
labels and that the user should seek them out before using
the grinder.
The problem is further compounded when one considers
the myriad of ways in which even a simple piece of equipment
like a meat grinder could be modified to affect safety. A manu-
facturer could foresee, for example, the replacement of the
original three-pronged grounded electrical cord with a two-
pronged ungrounded cord. The Liriano III opinion would there-
fore impose a duty to place a warning on the product instruct-
ing the operator that it originally came with a three-pronged
plug, that a two-pronged plug increases the risk of electrical
shock, and that the operator should refrain from using the
machine if the three-pronged plug is not present.
Consider the impact of such a rule if it is then expanded to
all of the equipment potentially encountered by a supermarket
employee. In the course of a single day, he will need to be
educated, again through on-product labelling, about the origi-
nal "safe" configuration of the forklift in the stockroom, how to
determine the presence and working condition of features such
as the back-up alarm, rollover protection system, transmission,
and brakes, and how to detect shorts or defeated safety switch-
es. How does a manufacturer teach a seventeen-year-old about
the original "safe" configuration of an industrial trash compac-
tor? A loading dock leveler? A meat slicer? A pallet mover?
'" In fact, that appears to have happened in the Liriano case, in which there
was evidence that the grinder was originally sold with a warning label cautioning
against putting one's fingers into the grinder, but that the label was no longer
present at the time of the accident. See supra note 9.
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Imagine the number of labels that would have to be plastered
on the company van to let the youthful delivery driver know
that the truck would be safer if the seatbelts, airbags, antilock
brakes, and ignition interlock were intact and functioning per
the manufacturer's specifications.
Fundamentally, the Liriano III decision tells manufactur-
ers that they must provide warnings that begin with: "This
product was originally sold with these components [insert list
of parts], which were configured in the following way [insert
specifications]. You may be at increased risk of injury [insert
injuries] if you use the product without any of these compo-
nents or features, or if they were modified in any way." The
warning would then have to provide specific hazard and conse-
quence information regarding each potential removal, modifica-
tion, addition, or substitution of each part or combination of
parts, all to the end of informing the operator that there is a
"safer alternative," namely, the way the manufacturer de-
signed and manufactured the product to begin with. To satisfy
the safety needs of all who might become victims of third
parties' destructive alterations of reasonably safe products
would not merely add a few words to existing warnings, but
would create an unending, constantly changing laundry list of
warnings on all types of obvious risks.
Widespread adherence to such a rule would not only fail to
advance product safety; it would be truly counterproductive.
Apart from whether any manufacturer could realistically hope
through warning labels to educate users of equipment in the
workplace about the safety ramifications of all possible modifi-
cations to the equipment, the result would be an unprecedent-
ed proliferation of warning labels. The social cost of
"overwarning," not in monetary terms but in the diversion of
limited user attention to warnings that are perceived as ver-
bose, irrelevant false alarms, has been recognized by human
factors scientists,92 courts,93 and commentators94  alike.
92 See, e.g., J. EDWORTHY & A. ADAMS, WARNING DESIGN: A RESEARCH PER-
SPECTIVE (1996); B. KANTowrrz & R. SORKIN, HUMAN FACTORS: UNDERSTANDING
PEOPLE-SYSTEM RELATIONSHIPS (1983); T. Ayres et al., What is a Warning and
When Will it Work?, PROC. OF THE HUMAN FACTORS SOCY 33D ANNUAL MEETING
426 (1989); Dorris, supra note 82, at 1076; R. Driver, A Communication Model for
Determining the Appropriateness of On-Product Warnings, IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON
PROF. COMM. 157-63 (1987); J. Frantz et al., Potential Problems Associated with
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Since most warnings must not only be read once but re-read,
and since the information provided in such "Liriano warnings"
would be completely irrelevant most of the time, imagine the
disincentive for users asked repeatedly to absorb a plethora of
warnings that include copious statements of the obvious. The
increased competition for user attention would come at the
expense of those truly necessary warnings about hidden dan-
gers that, if read and heeded, have the potential to motivate a
change in the user's safety-related behavior. The New York
Court of Appeals made precisely this point in explaining the
rationale underlying the principle that there is no duty to
warn of obvious or well-known risks:
[R]equiring a manufacturer to warn against obvious dangers could
greatly increase the number of warnings accompanying certain prod-
ucts. If a manufacturer must warn against even obvious dangers,
"[t]he list of foolish practices warned against would be so long, it
would fill a volume." Requiring too many warnings trivializes and
undermines the entire purpose of the rule, drowning out cautions
Overusing Warnings, PROC. OF THE 7TH INT'L CONF. ON PRODUCT SAFET RES.,
AND PROC. OF THE HUMAN FACTORS & ERGONOMICS SOC'Y 274 (1999); R. Krenek &
J. Purswell, Warning Label Content Strategies: An Approach to the Integration of
User Knowledge and Designer Judgment, INTL J. COGNITIVE ERGONOMICS 2, 53-60
(1998); J. Purswell et al., Warning Effectiveness: What Do We Know?, PROC. OF
THE HUMAN FACTORS SoCkY 31ST ANNUAL MEETING 1116-20 (1987).
" See Cotton v. Buckeye Gas Prods. Co., 840 F.2d 935, 937-38 (D.C. Cir. 1988)
("Failure-to-warn cases have the curious property that when the episode is exam-
ined in hindsight, it appears as though addition of warnings keyed to a particular
accident would be virtually cost free. What could be simpler than for the manufac-
turer to add the few simple items noted above? The primary cost is, in fact, the
increase in time and effort required for the user to grasp the message. The inclu-
sion of each extra item dilutes the punch of every other item. Given short atten-
tion spans, items crowd each other out; they get lost in fine print .... Plaintiffs
analysis completely disregards the problem of information costs .... If every
foreseeable possibility must be covered, 'the list of foolish practices warned against
would be so long, it would fill a volume.' Unlike plaintiff, we must review the
record in light of these obvious information costs." (citations omitted)); Broussard
v. Continental Oil Co., 433 So. 2d 354, 358 (La. Ct. App. 1983) ("As a practical
matter, the effect of putting at least ten warnings on the drill would decrease the
effectiveness of all of the warnings. A consumer would have a tendency to read
none of the warnings if the surface of the drill became cluttered with the warn-
ings."); see also Kerr v. Koemm, 557 F. Supp. 283, 288 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Finn
v. G.D. Searle & Co., 677 P.2d 1147, 1153 (Cal. 1984); Dunn v. Lederle Labs., 328
N.W.2d 576, 580-81 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982).
" See, e.g., Henderson & Twerski, supra note 69, at 296-97; Victor E. Schwartz
& Russell W. Driver, Warnings in the Workplace: The Need for Synthesis of Law
and Communication Theory, 52 U. CIN. L. REV. 38, 58-60 (1983).
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against latent dangers of which a user might not otherwise be
aware. Such a requirement would neutralize the effectiveness of
warnings as an inexpensive way to allow consumers to adjust their
behavior based on knowledge of a product's inherent dangers."
In this regard, it is ironic that the Second Circuit seems to
have missed not only the philosophical underpinning of the
New York Court of Appeals opinion, but the primary point of
the law review article that the court credited for inspiring the
new duty to inform users of "safer alternatives" to obvious
risks. Far from encouraging the creation of expanded duties,
Henderson and Twerski urged a "hard, critical look" at unprin-
cipled standards for failure to warn which proliferate frivolous
litigation; they continued:
[I]n failure-to-warn cases the common assumption is that warnings
can often be improved upon but can never be made worse; that is,
the issue at stake is always whether the defendant ought to have
supplied consumers with more, and by definition better, information
about product risks. Whether the defendant should have supplied
more information seems, therefore, an intuitively manageable, emi-
nently adjudicable question.'
The authors then went on to demonstrate that the "question"
is anything but "intuitively manageable" and "eminently
adjudicable."97 They described precisely the difficulties dis-
cussed above, i.e., the social costs and limited helpfulness of
proliferation of warnings.98
The court in Cotton v. Buckeye Gas Products Co." ex-
pressed similar concerns:
Failure-to-warn cases have the curious property that when the
episode is examined in hindsight, it appears as though addition of
warnings keyed to a particular accident would be virtually cost free.
What could be simpler than for the manufacturer to add the few
simple items noted above. The primary cost is, in fact, the increase
in time and effort required for the user to grasp the message. The
inclusion of each extra item dilutes the punch of every other item.
Given short attention spans, items crowd each other out; they get
lost in fine print.
Liriano II, 92 N.Y.2d 232, 242, 700 N.E.2d 303, 308, 677 N.Y.S.2d 764, 769
(1998) (quoting Kerr, 557 F. Supp. at 288).
"6 Henderson & Twerski, supra note 69, at 269-70 (citations omitted).
97 Id. at 270.
98 See id. at 296-303.
99 840 F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
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... Plaintiffs analysis completely disregards the problem of
information costs .... If every foreseeable possibility must be cov-
ered, "the list of foolish practices warned against would be so long, it
would fill a volume." Unlike plaintiff, we must review the record in
light of these obvious information costs." °
Indeed, the New York Court of Appeals, in its opinion on
the questions certified by the Second Circuit, echoed these
considerations:
Requiring too many warnings trivializes and undermines the entire
purpose of the rule, drowning out cautions against latent dangers of
Which a user might not otherwise be aware. Such a requirement
would neutralize the effectiveness of warnings as an inexpensive
way to allow consumers to adjust their behavior based on knowledge
of a product's inherent dangers.'
Scientists specializing in this area of human cognition
confirm these courts' understanding of the problems associated
with the proliferation of warnings. In their article Potential
Problems Associated with Overusing Warnings,10 2 Frantz et
al. describe the concerns arising out of the overuse of warnings
that have been discussed or reported in the scientific and re-
search literature. These include reduced attention to warnings
generally,' reduced attention to individual messages within
warnings (i.e., the selective filtering out of messages within a
warning, or the "skipping" of warning information deemed
unimportant or already known to the user),04 reduced recall
of certain warning messages because of human memory limita-
tions, O5 reduced believability or credibility of warnings (espe-
cially where warnings are perceived as raising remote risks or
"false alarms"),0 6 reduced ability to differentiate the relative
magnitude of risks,0 7 and misplaced reliance on the com-
pleteness of the warning label.' While the authors empha-
size that not all of these concerns have yet been the subject of
100 Id. at 937-38 (citations omitted).
101 Liriano II, 92 N.Y.2d 232, 242, 700 N.E.2d 303, 308, 677 N.Y.S.2d 764, 769
(1998).
102 See Frantz et al., supra note 92, at 274.
10 See Frantz et al., supra note 92, at 274-75.
104 See Frantz et al., supra note 92, at 275.
See Frantz et al., supra note 92, at 275-76.
Frantz et al., supra note 92, at 276-77.
107 Frantz et al., supra note 92, at 277.
100 See Frantz et al., supra note 92, at 277.
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empirical study, "there is virtually total agreement in the
warnings-related literature that providing product warnings
about all risks associated with a product is an ill-fated and in-
correct approach." °9
Moreover, Frantz notes, these concerns arise not simply
from the sheer number of warnings provided on any particular
product, but also out of the cumulative number of warnings on
products generally and the inclusion of warnings that have
questionable value in terms of injury prevention. "Thus, the
issue of overusing warnings is far more complex than merely
counting the number of warnings on a label on a product. It is
not simply an intra-product issue, but also an inter-product
issue.""' The article concludes that "deciding when and how
to provide warnings often requires consideration of the poten-
tial impact, both positive and negative, of adding a particular
warning to a product or manual.""'
Thus, the impact of a poorly-designed warnings policy and
ill-conceived duty is not only upon the manufacturer and user
of the specific product involved in an individual case, or
even those manufacturers and users to whom the duty might
logically extend, but in its cumulative effect, upon all manu-
facturers and users who rely upon warnings to motivate safe-
ty-related behavior. Unfortunately, in Liriano III, there
appears to have been no "consideration of the potential im-
pact, both positive and negative" of adding the type of warn-
ing proposed by the court to the Hobart grinder, let alone to
every other product that may be susceptible of third-party
destructive alterations.
Liriano III must also be considered for the duty it appears
to impose on manufacturers after the product has been sold.
Nothing in the Second Circuit opinion or in the parties' briefs
suggests that at the time of original sale Hobart had any rea-
son to foresee that purchasers of its meat grinders would forc-
ibly remove the riveted guard."' Indeed, it appears that the
109 Frantz et al., supra note 92, at 277.
110 Frantz et al., supra note 92, at 277.
... Frantz et al., supra note 92, at 278.
1 The New York Court of Appeals held in Amatulli v. Delhi Construction
Corp., 77 N.Y.2d 525, 571 N.E.2d 645, 569 N.Y.S.2d 337 (1991), that there is no
duty to warn of a risk created by the subsequent transformation of a product
unless the manufacturer knew, at the time of sale, that such modifications were
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subject grinder survived more than 30 years with the guard
intact."' Moreover, even the plaintiff's own expert appears to
have agreed that the grinder was safe when sold and that the
safety features made warnings unnecessary."' Therefore, the
tacit implication of Liriano III is that at some point subsequent
to sale, when Hobart learned that some owners were removing
the guards, Hobart should not only have affixed warnings to
its new grinders, but it should have also sought out prior
purchasers to recall and relabel the grinders with warnings
of the obvious risks of operating without the permanently
affixed guards.
The ramifications of such a duty, particularly for manufac-
turers of durable products that not only can be expected to last
many years, but are often transferred from owner to owner,
are staggering and utterly unprecedented in New York law.
The seminal New York case on post-sale duty to warn, Cover v.
Cohen,"5 involved the manufacturer's post-sale duty to warn
of a defect that existed at the time of sale but which was not
discovered until later. It is one thing to conclude that a manu-
facturer who belatedly learns of a product defect is obligated
to take reasonable steps to inform existing owners, and quite
another to impose a duty on a manufacturer of a reasonably.
safe product to seek out purchasers to inform them about the
obvious dangers resulting from the post-sale conduct of
third parties who defeat and destroy the safety features of
that product.
Even the more expansive recognition of post-sale duty to
warn articulated in the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products
Liability § 10 (1998) limits the imposition of such a duty to
situations where
(1) the seller knows or reasonably should know that the product
poses a substantial risk of harm to persons or property; and (2)
those to whom a warning might be provided can be identified and
may reasonably be assumed to be unaware of the risk of harm; and
(3) a warning can be effectively communicated to and acted on by
being made.
11 See supra notes 6-13.
114 See Brief for Appellant at 19, Liriano v. Hobart Corp., 92 N.Y.2d 232, 700
N.E.2d 303, 677 N.Y.S.2d 764 (1998).
I' 61 N.Y.2d 261, 461 N.E.2d 864, 473 N.Y.S.2d 378 (1984).
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those to whom a warning might be provided; and (4) the risk of
harm is sufficiently great to justify the burden of providing a
warning.1
Comment a to section 10 of the Restatement explains the
rationale for caution in imposing such a duty, and the impor-
tance of the court's role in delimiting it:
Nevertheless, an unbounded post-sale duty to warn would impose
unacceptable burdens on product sellers. The costs of identifying
and communicating with product users years after sale are often
daunting ....
As with all rules that raise the question whether a duty exists,
courts must make the threshold decisions that, in particular cases,
triers of fact could reasonably find that product sellers can practical-
ly and effectively discharge such an obligation and that the risks of
harm are sufficiently great to justify what is typically a substantial
post-sale undertaking .... In light of the serious potential for over-
burdening sellers in this regard, the court should carefully examine
the circumstances for and against imposing a duty to provide a post-
sale warning in a particular case. 17
While it appears from the Second Circuit opinion there
was evidence Hobart "knew or reasonably should know" after it
sold the subject grinder that some employers had removed
some guards from grinders, and that an unguarded grinder
posed "a substantial risk of harm,""8 there is no information
from which a court or jury could conclude that the remaining
three requirements were met. On the contrary, given the
change in ownership of the subject product, the obviousness of
the risks, the destruction of the safety feature by the employer,
and the relative powerlessness of the employee, the facts of
Liriano offer a textbook example of why courts should be loath
to view a post-sale duty to warn as an effective safety measure
in such cases.
Manufacturers should not be required to expend huge
resources to send multiple notices about risks of which they
can assume users will be cognizant or to send warnings that
they have no reason to believe will be effective. Moreover,
consumers cannot possibly want safety dollars spent in this
116 RESTATEMENT, supra note 56, § 10, at 191.
17 Id. cmt. a, at 192.
18 That is, the first element required to be established to impose a post-sale
duty to warn under the Restatement. See id. § 10.
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way or mailboxes stuffed with such mindless, overwhelmingly
irrelevant notices. None of the comments and none of the cases
cited in the Reporters' Notes supporting section 10 of the Re-
statement supports the imposition of such a duty under the
facts set forth in Liriano,"' and nothing in Cover v. Cohen
even comes close.
The natural effect of Liriano III on the decision-making of
manufacturers would be to motivate them to attempt to
innoculate themselves against this new onslaught of product
liability by papering their products with advisories about the
"safer alternatives" to the myriad obvious ways in which the
products might be abused or misused to cause injury. Because
the court in Liriano III did not give significant thought to
whether such a program would improve product safety, the
manufacturers must necessarily also take from the opinion the
lesson that liability avoidance, not improved safety, is the goal
to be sought by their decision-making. When products liability
law encourages manufacturers to be more concerned about
limiting their liability exposure than accomplishing real safety
gains, it has failed in its essential purpose.
* * *
If the Liriano III decision is followed by New York courts,
then all manufacturers who sell products in that state must
now give warnings, including post-sale warnings, about safer
alternatives even in the face of obvious dangers. It is doubtful
the Liriano jury considered how broad and unmanageable the
imposition of such a duty would be or the consequences of
imposing such a duty. Certainly, the Second Circuit itself did
not. It is a flawed lawmaking process to leave such matters to
a single jury that has not considered the relevant policy issues.
For this reason alone the Liriano III decision must be rejected
by other courts addressing comparable issues.
C. Liriano Was Not an Appropriate Scenario for Application of
an "Informed-Choice" Warning Analysis
In its effort to find some precedent in legal analysis for its
decision, the court in Liriano III sought to posture its ruling as
a natural application of the concept of "informed choice warn-
119 See id. at 192-200.
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ings" described by Henderson and Twerski. But neither the
"steep grade" scenario2 nor the Liriano fact scenario were
conducive to application of the "informed choice" paradigm, and
the Liriano III court's extension of the concept to these set-
tings was not only unprecedented, but ill-conceived.
Henderson and Twerski explained their view of two types
of warnings thus: "Several early commentators distinguished
between warnings to reduce the risk of harm-risk-reduction
warnings-and warnings given simply to inform the purchaser
that the use of the product involves a nonreducible
risk-informed-choice warnings."'
Thus, in the "risk-reduction" scenario, a warning may help
the consumer reduce the risk of product-related injury by in-
structing the consumer about risks associated with a product's
use and how to avoid those risks by using the product correct-
ly."2 On the other hand, in the less common "informed
choice" scenario, Henderson and Twerski suggested that a
12 The Liriano court did not refer to a single reported decision or statute in
support of its holding. Instead, the court analogized the case to an imaginary
scenario in which the court determined that a highway sign saying "Steep Grade
Ahead-Follow Suggested Detour to Avoid Dangerous Areas" was better than one
that merely said "Danger-Steep Grade." Liriano I1, 170 F.3d 264, 270 (2d Cir.
1999). Apart from whether the proposed long-form "steep grade" warning would
actually be more effective in preventing accidents (a proposition for which there
was no foundation laid in the opinion), the obviousness of the dangers of a steep
grade, the ability to communicate the alternatives, and the likely response of a
driver cannot fairly be compared to the obviousness of the danger of sticking one's
hand into a meat grinder and the likely response of a young, uneducated, and
unskilled employee to the type of on-product label that would be necessitated by
this decision. Because the proposition underlying the analogy was unsupported,
and the analogy itself easily distinguishable, it cannot sustain the Second Circuit's
conclusions. Furthermore, because the court avoided answering the question briefed
by the parties-whether the danger of putting one's hand into a meat grinder was
obvious-and instead embarked upon a new theory of liability for failure to warn of
even obvious dangers, the court's consideration of both the analogy and the theory
premised upon it had the benefit neither of precedent nor of any evidence or argu-
ment from the parties. Thus, the process itself was flawed and would tend to
undermine the confidence in the outcome of such judicial decision-making. See
EDWARD H. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 5 (University of Chicago
Press 1949) ("The forum protects the parties and the community by making sure
that competing analogies are before the court. The rule which will be created
arises out of a process in which if different things are to be treated as similar, at
least the differences have been urged. In this sense, the parties as well as the
court participate in the law-making.").
121 Henderson & Twerski, supra note 69, at 285 n.88 (citations omitted).
12 See id. at 285 n.87.
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warning may provide the consumer with information about
latent, unavoidable risks inherent in the use of a product, i.e.,
risks that cannot ordinarily be reduced or avoided simply by
modifying the manner in which the product is used.' In-
deed, the consumer's interaction with the product and with its
attendant risks is largely passive except for the initial, binary
decision about whether to use the product in the first place. "In
the case of unavoidably unsafe products, the user or consumer
typically can do little or nothing to reduce the risk of injury
once the choice to use or consume is made."" Instead, the
consumer, applying his own "risk-benefit analysis," must
choose whether he wishes to encounter those risks or avoid
them by declining to use the product altogether.'
Cases finding a duty to provide a so-called "informed-
choice warning" have generally been "limited to prescription
drugs and cosmetics, although occasionally other products are
implicated." 6 Typical examples of these warnings in our so-
ciety include the warnings on inserts in prescription drugs
which advise of the risk of side-effects, or the language some-
times found on cosmetics which note the possibility of aller-
gic reactions.
In contrast, the scenario in the Liriano case has none of
the characteristics of the settings in which courts have found
"informed choice" warnings appropriate. The case involves
methods of keeping employees' hands out of operating meat
grinders. The risk was neither latent nor unavoidable. On the
contrary, the risk was obvious: the grinder can and will grind
whatever is put into it. The manner of avoiding the risk was
equally obvious: Keep hands out of the grinder. If the worker
was uncomfortable with his ability to keep his hands out of the
grinder given its configuration, he had the option (if he had
any options at all) of declining to use the grinder. Thus, every
purpose of the "informed choice" warning is served-the user is
aware of the risk, and can avoid it by careful use of the prod-
uct, or by declining to use the product at all.
"2 See id.
'2 Id. at 285 n.88.
123 Id.
128 Henderson & Twerski, supra note 69, at 286 & nn.89-90 (collecting cases
involving tampons, deodorant, and asbestos).
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Nothing in the cases that have dealt with "informed
choice" warnings has suggested that the manufacturer must
first warn of obvious risks and then embark upon an exposi-
tion of the array of available alternatives, including the alter-
natives that would have been present had someone not forcibly
defeated them. In fact, the reasoning of Liriano III would sug-
gest that the manufacturer should not even stop there, but
should go on to describe the alternatives that would have been
present if the purchaser had selected them as options, and
perhaps even, in true "Miracle on 34th Street" fashion, the
alternatives that would have been present if the purchaser had
selected a competitor's product.27
Clearly, such an undertaking would be impractical and
ultimately self-defeating, yet, all of this would appear to follow
from the rationale underlying the Liriano III court's seemingly
innocuous extension of the concept of "informed choice" warn-
ings to the facts before it. The rationale underlying "informed
choice" warnings is not advanced by their extension into this
setting, and the policy considerations that militate against
imposing a duty to warn of obvious risks are as powerful as in
the cases that first articulated those considerations. To extend
the "informed choice" concept under these circumstances, and,
moreover, in the absence of any support for the efficacy of this
type of warning in preventing this or any injury, is contrary to
the goal of products liability law to foster wise safety policy
and to promote good safety decision-making.
12 If there are risks (including even latent risks) associated with the alterna-
tive, the manufacturer would surely need to describe them as well, so that the
user could make an "informed choice" about whether to proceed with the alterna-
tive. For example, in the "steep grade" analogy, the Highway Department may
need to analyze whether there are other traffic hazards on the "flatter" road that
drivers should take into account in deciding which route to choose. Those hazards
may, of course, change over time if there is a significant diversion of new traffic
onto the "flatter" route as a result of the advisory. Similarly, if a warning advis-
ing the user that a meat grinder is supposed to have a guard results in a bungled
attempt to replace the guard, the result may well be a false sense of security that
makes the grinder more dangerous because it appears safe-yet another issue to be
addressed in the warning.
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D. There Should Be No Causation Presumption in Cases
Involving Open and Obvious Dangers
Having announced an unprecedented new duty to warn
that obvious dangers may be avoided by using a product with
all of its parts intact, thereby effectively abrogating the princi-
ple that there is no duty to warn against obvious dangers, and
having intuited that such warnings would be effective gener-
ally, the Second Circuit severed the final tie between its view
of the law on failure to warn and the real world by declaring
that a jury may infer simply from the absence of the warning
and the occurrence of the injury that a warning would have
prevented the injury, effectively shifting to the defendant the
burden of producing evidence of non-causation.
In essence, the Liriano III court applied a "heeding pre-
sumption," a device employed by some courts to shift the bur-
den of producing evidence as to causation where the facts es-
tablish that a warning was required.' The heeding pre-
sumption permits a jury to infer that the warning the jury
finds should have been given, would have been read and heed-
ed by the plaintiff.'29 Just as in Liriano III, the presumption
allows the plaintiff to make out a prima facie case of causation,
shifting the burden to the defendant to'produce evidence of
noncausation. Thus, while the Second Circuit did not call its
burden-shifting exercise a presumption, the effect was the
same, as is evident from Rule 301 of the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence. 3 ° In so doing, Liriano III ignores existing New York
I" See Coffinan v. Keene Corp., 628 A.2d 710, 718 (N.J. 1993); House v.
Armour of Am., Inc., 886 P.2d 542 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
129 See Coffinan, 628 A.2d at 718; House, 886 P.2d at 542.
I" The effect of a presumption "affecting the burden of producing evidence" is
that the existence of the presumed fact is assumed unless and until evidence is
introduced which would support a finding of its nonexistence. The effect of a pre-
sumption affecting the burden of proof is to impose upon the party against whom
it operates the burden of proof as to the nonexistence of the presumed fact. To
understand the different effects of the two types of presumptions, consider the pre-
sumption of receipt that arises from evidence that a letter has been mailed, and
suppose the intended recipient claims he never got it. If the presumption of re-
ceipt is one "affecting the burden of producing evidence," then the presumption
ceases to have any effect once the intended recipient introduces evidence that will
support a finding that he never got the letter, and no finding one way or the
other is compelled by the weight that might be assigned to his evidence. But if
the presumption is one "affecting the burden of proof," then the intended
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and Second Circuit precedent and articulates an approach that
ignores policy, common sense, and real world considerations.
1. Liriano IrIs Application of an "Inference of
Causation" Was Contrary to New York and
Second Circuit Precedent
Before Liriano III, the Second Circuit in Raney v. Owens-
Illinois, Inc.,' considered the role of inferences and pre-
sumptions on causation in failure to warn cases under New
York law and found that New York had never recognized a
"heeding presumption" in warning cases."2 It did note that
while the plaintiff has the burden of proving causation, the
New York courts had acknowledged that in failure to warn
cases, as in other cases, "causation may sometimes be inferred
from the facts and circumstances that the plaintiff has present-
ed .... Accordingly, even though a plaintiff is not entitled to a
presumption, a jury might be permitted to infer the necessary
element of causation."'33 On the other hand, the court in
Raney specifically pointed out, an inference of causation will
not be available in cases "where a warning is not reasonably
required because the danger is obvious.""
Instead of following Raney, or at least examining the cases
and authorities to determine whether the New York Court of
Appeals, given the opportunity, would change course and now
decide to adopt such a presumption in a warnings case, the
panel in Liriano III turned to Martin v. Herzog,135 a case of
negligence per se which did not involve warnings at all. The
recipient's testimony would not destroy the presumption, and he would have to
prove by greater weight of the evidence that the letter was not delivered. See
JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S FEDERAL EVIDENCE
§ 301.01-.02 (Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., Matthew Bender 2d ed. 1997).
Like other courts applying a heeding presumption, the Liriano III court noted
that the inference it permitted the jury to draw affected only the burden of pro-
ducing evidence, not the burden of proof. Accordingly, the shifting of burdens did
not require Hobart to prove non-causation. Rather, it simply relieved plaintiff of
the burden of coming forward with evidence of causation. See Liriano //, 170 F.3d
264, 272 & n.5 (2d Cir. 1999).
"' 897 F.2d 94 (2d Cir. 1990).
" Id. at 95-96 (citations omitted).
"' Id. at 96.
13 Id. (citations omitted).
i' 228 N.Y. 164, 170, 126 N.E. 814, 816 (1920).
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doctrine of negligence per se may well support the application
of a presumption that shifts the burden to the defendant to
produce evidence of noncausation when it is shown that he
injured someone in the course of violating a statute specifically
designed to prevent such an injury. As the Liriano III court ob-
served, the court shifted the burden of proof in Martin because
"the legislature deemed driving without lights after sundown
to be negligent precisely because not using lights tended to
cause accidents of the sort that had occurred in the case."136
But Liriano did not involve the violation of any statute and
therefore did not involve the doctrine of negligence per se.
Whether the kind of negligence attributed to the defendant
tends to cause the kind of injury plaintiff suffered is not alone
enough to justify shifting the burden of production under Rule
301 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. A civil presumption af-
fecting the burden of producing evidence requires "some ratio-
nal connection between the fact proved and the ultimate fact
presumed." 3 ' "The basis for the rational connection test in-
cludes considerations of policy and convenience, although con-
venience alone will not always justify the creation of a pre-
sumption."38 In a case of negligence per se, such as Martin v.
Herzog, the legislature has already evaluated the relevant
policy issues. In a warning case involving an obvious danger,
however, the relevant policy issues have not been examined by
the legislature and therefore at the very least should have
been examined by the court before shifting the burden of pro-
ducing evidence to the defendant on the issue of causation.
When those policy considerations are evaluated, the Martin
concept of "causation per se" is fundamentally unfair and inap-
posite, especially where the dangers were apparent even with-
out a warning.
1 Liriano III, 170 F.3d 264, 272 (2d Cir. 1999) (citing Martin, 228 N.Y. at 168,
126 N.E. at 815).
137 Mobile, Jackson & Kansas City R.R. Co. v. Turnipseed, 219 U.S. 35, 43
(1910).




2. Adoption of a Heeding Presumption in a Failure to
Warn Case, Especially One Involving Obvious Dangers,
Is Not Supported by the Recognized Bases for Creating
Presumptions
Traditionally, courts and commentators have pointed to
four rationales for creating presumptions: (1) to correct an
imbalance resulting from one party's superior access to the
proof necessary to rebut the presumption; (2) to promote a
particular social and economic policy; (3) to avoid an impasse
or reach some result, even though the result may be arbitrary;
and (4) because the proof of a particular fact renders the infer-
ence of the existence of another fact so probable that it is sen-
sible and timesaving to assume the truth of the inferred fact
until the adversary disproves it."' In most cases, the pre-
sumption is not based upon any one of these reasons standing
alone, but rather has been created for a combination of these
and other reasons.'4 ° Some presumptions are tied closely to
the area of substantive law to which they apply, particularly
those presumptions established to further some social policy.
For example, employees in employment discrimination cases
are entitled to certain presumptions which, when the employee
produces certain facts establishing a prima facie case, shift the
burden to the employer to provide proof of a legitimate, non-
discriminatory reason for the challenged action.'" Those pre-
sumptions respond to the employer's superior access to proof,
promote public policy embedded in statutory and constitutional
rights, and reflect the recognized probability based on histori-
cal experience that if an employee is able to establish the ele-
ments of the prima facie case, it was more likely than not that
the employee had in fact suffered discrimination.
On the other hand, the presumption in a failure to warn
case that if an adequate warning had been given, plaintiff
would have read and heeded it, does not advance any of the
goals identified above. First, it does not correct an imbalance
caused by one party's superior access to the proof necessary to
rebut the presumption. On the contrary, the manufacturer has
139 See JOHN W. STRONG ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 343 (4th ed. 1992).
14 See id. § 343, at 455.
.41 See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Greene, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
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less access to proof regarding the plaintiff's knowledge, practic-
es, judgment, attention, and state of mind which might have
affected the likelihood that he or she would read and heed a
warning. Therefore, to shift the burden of production to the
manufacturer to prove that a warning would not have changed
the plaintiff's behavior significantly handicaps the party who
already has inferior access to relevant evidence.
Second, the heeding presumption does not promote
desireable social and economic policies. While one might theo-
rize that the increased risk of liability costs as a result of the
application of the presumption would motivate manufacturers
to devote additional resources to providing adequate warnings
and instructions, it is just as likely that the effect would be to
encourage manufacturers to plaster their products with self-
serving, liability-reducing warnings without regard to actual
effectiveness, a result that, as discussed above, would run
counter to good safety policy.
Similarly, the heeding presumption does not avoid an
impasse, but rather encourages a purely arbitrary result. By
contrast, the presumption of survivorship of persons who died
in a common disaster is necessary to allow other rules of law
to operate, even though there is no factual basis upon which to
believe that one party or the other was likely to have died
first.4" Similarly, the presumption of death of someone who
has not been seen or heard from for seven years, facilitates the
resolution of rights that otherwise may be stalled.' Neither
of these interests would appear to be served by the heeding
presumption in failure to warn cases.
Perhaps most important, however, the heeding presump-
tion is not based on experience or research justifying the as-
sessment of a high probability that the user would have read
and heeded an alternative warning. On the contrary, as will be
seen, the scientific research tends to cast doubt on the effec-
tiveness of on-product warnings in consistently or predictably
modifying safety-related behavior in real world circumstances.
1 See id. § 343, at 454.
1 29 AM. JU1L 2D Evidence § 185 (1994).
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3. Adoption of a Heeding Presumption in a Failure to
Warn Case, Especially One Involving Obvious
Dangers, Flies in the Face of Scientific Research and
Real World Experience Which Tends to Show that
Product Users Do Not Consistently Read and Heed
On-Product Warnings
The idea of using warning labels to decrease risk is found-
ed on two fundamental assumptions: (1) human behavior is
important in controlling the frequency and severity of consum-
er product related accidents and (2) human behavior can be
modified toward reducing frequency and severity of accidents
by the presence of warning labels.' The second assumption
is based on the further assumptions that (a) a user will notice
and read a warning label; (b) a user will understand a warning
label; (c) the information in the warning label is useful in pre-
venting the accident or mitigating severity; and (d) the user
will act appropriately based on the information contained in
the warning label. 45
Most agree that in the right circumstances, on-product
warnings can play a useful role in guiding the behavior of
individuals who are seeking information about how to use the
product safely, and who are motivated to comply with that
information when they receive it. On the other hand, everyday
experience and observation tells us that on-product warnings
are routinely overlooked, ignored, and disobeyed for any num-
ber of reasons that have nothing to do with the quality of the
information or the manner of its presentation. Warnings may
get short shrift because the user is distracted or hurried, or
because the user chooses to follow the lead of friends or co-
workers rather than the admonitions on the warning label.
Other times, the user may ignore or disobey warnings because
he has previous product experience that has led him to con-
clude that the risk is minimal, or she may have concluded that
the "cost" in time or inconvenience of following the warning
outweighs the perceived risk of ignoring it.
1" See Roger McCarthy et al., Warnings on Consumer Products: Objective Crite-
ria for Their Use, in HUMAN FACTORS PERSPECTIVES ON WARNINGS 164 (K
Laughery et al. eds., 1994).
14 See id.
[Vol. 65: 3
LIRANO V. HOBART CORP.
Beyond these everyday observations, the efforts of re-
searchers to prove by scientific means that on-product warn-
ings are indeed effective to modify safety-related behavior in
actual or simulated real-world applications have generally
yielded disappointing results. 46 These efforts have included
not only attempts by researchers to compare the behavior of
subjects exposed to a warning with the behavior of subjects
who were not, 47 but also studies analyzing targeted accident
data for a particular product or group of products before and
after warnings intended to address those types of accidents
were introduced.48 While the interpretation of the results of
these studies on the question of whether on-product warnings
have ever been found effective to modify safety-related behav-
ior has been the subject of some debate within the human
factors community," the research clearly establishes that
"'See id. at 165; David DeJoy, Consumer Products Warnings: Review and Anal-
ysis of Effectiveness Research, in HUMAN FACTORS PERSPECTIVES ON WARNINGS 16
(K. Laughery et al. eds., 1994); see also T. Ayres et al., Effectivenss of Warning
Labels and Signs: An Update on Compliance Research, PROC. OF THE SILICON
VALLEY ERGONOMICS CONF. AND EXPOSITION 199-205 (ErgoCon 1998) (citing arti-
cles).
14 See, e.g., D. Fergusson et al., A Controlled Field Trial of a Poisoning Preven-
tion Method, 69 (5) PEDIATRICS 515-20 (1982); M. Lehto & J. Foley, Risk-Taking,
Warning, Labels, Training, and Regulation: Are They Associated with the Use of
Helmets by All-Terrain Vehicle Riders?, 22 J. SAFETY RES. 191-200 (1991).
'" See S. Arndt et al., Warning Labels and Accident Data, PROC. OF THE HU-
MAN FACTORS AND ERGONOMICS SocY 42D ANNUAL MEETING 550 (1998); L.
Kerpelman, Evaluation of the Effectiveness of Outdoor Power Equipment Informa-
tion and Education Programs (AAI No. 78-27) (Cambridge, MA, ABT Associates,
Inc. 1978); S. Soumerai et al., Effects of Professional and Media Warnings About
the Association Between Aspirin Use in Children and Reye's Syndrome, 70 (1)
MILBANK Q. 155-82 (1992); S. Soumerai et al., Effect of Government and Commer-
cial Warnings on Reducing Prescription Misuse: The Case of Propoxyphene, 77 (12)
AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1518-23 (1987); see also L. Robertson et al., A Controlled
Study of the Effect of Television Messages on Safety Belt Use, 64 (11) AM. J. PUB.
HEALTH 1071-80 (1974). Other efforts to analyze accident data have looked at
accident or incident investigation reports to determine whether the incidents oc-
curred despite the presence of warnings directed to the behavior that caused the
incidents. See, e.g., K. Laughery & D. Lovvoll, Automatic Shoulder Belt Manual
Lap Belt Restraint Systems: Human Factors Analyses of Case Studies Data, PROC.
OF THE HUMAN FACTORS AND ERGONOMICS Soc'Y 42D ANNUAL MEETING 492-96
(1996); K Laughery et al., Tire-Rim Mismatch Explosions: The Role of On-Product
Warnings, PROC. OF THE HUMAN FACTORS AND ERGONOMICS SOC'Y 42D ANNUAL
MEETING 1088-92 (1998).
'" See Eli Cox, Do Product Warnings Increase Safe Behavior? A Meta-Analysis,
16 J. PUB. POL'Y & MARKETING 195-204 (1997) (citing articles).
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one cannot rely on even the most carefully-designed label
to consistently and reliably elicit compliance with its
admonitions. 5 '
At the same time, the courts, led by the decision of the
United States Supreme Court in Daubert,'5' are placing in-
creased emphasis on the requirement that expert opinion evi-
dence must meet a rigorous standard of reliability before it
may be admitted, including consideration of whether the opin-
ion has been developed and tested in a manner consistent with
accepted scientific methodology.'52 In the face of scientific re-
search as well as ordinary experience demonstrating how often
warning labels go unheeded, a presumption that a specific
product user would have behaved differently if only a warning
label (or a different warning label) had been present is funda-
150 See id.
151 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
162 Daubert counsels that "a key question to be answered in determining wheth-
er a theory or technique is scientific knowledge that will assist the trier of fact
will be whether it can be (and has been) tested." Id. at 593. Additionally, the
Daubert Court identified other "general observations" that are relevant in deter-
mining the scientific validity, and, therefore, the evidentiary reliability, of a partic-
ular methodology or technique, including- (1) "whether the theory or technique has
been subjected to peer review and publication"; (2) the "known or potential rate of
error" of the theory or technique; (3) "the existence and maintenance of standards
controlling the technique's operation"; and (4) whether the theory or technique has
reached general acceptance in "a relevant scientific community." Id. at 593-94.
Under Daubert, courts must also consider whether the expert testimony in ques-
tion "fits" the facts of the case and that the experts proffered opinion "will have a
reliable basis in the knowledge and experience of his discipline." Id& at 591-92.
Daubert limited its reach to experts' methodologies only, not their conclusions.
In General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997), the Court expanded its
reasoning, holding that
conclusions and methodology are not entirely distinct from one another.
Trained experts commonly extrapolate from existing data. But nothing in
either Daubert or the Federal Rules of Evidence requires a district court
to admit opinion evidence which is connected to existing data only by the
ipse dixit of the expert.
Id. at 146.
More recently, in Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 119 S. Ct. 1167 (1999), the
Court clarified the scope of Daubert and held that "a trial court should consider
the specific factors identified in Daubert where they are reasonable measures of
the reliability of expert testimony," regardless of whether the expert is testifying
about a scientific or non-scientific subject matter. Id. at 1176. Today, in the wake
of Daubert, Joiner, and Kumho Tire, parties are on notice of the exacting stan-
dards by which expert testimony is measured in the federal courts, as well as
many state courts that apply similar tests. See, e.g., Weisgrai v. Marley Co., 120
S. Ct. 1011 (2000).
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mentally at odds with the courts' efforts to insure that deci-
sion-making in products liability cases is based upon reliable
evidence rather than "junk science."
4. The Facts of this Case Cannot Support an "Inference of
Causation" or Application of the "Heeding
Presumption"
One need look no further than the Liriano case for circum-
stances illustrating the absurdity of applying a heeding pre-
sumption or "inference of causation" in a failure to warn case,
and particularly in a failure to warn case involving obvious
dangers. The very reason articulated by the courts for declin-
ing to impose a duty to warn of obvious dangers is that such
warnings would most likely be futile if the plaintiff was not
already motivated by the obviousness of the danger confronting
him. "3  That being true, it is ironic that the Liriano III
court not only imposed such a duty, but declared it to be so
self-evident that a warning about obvious risks would induce
safer behavior that a jury could infer it without the need for
any evidence on the subject. It is ironic, too, that the court
apparently gave the plaintiff the benefit of the inference not-
withstanding that the plaintiff had not requested or argued it
at trial, and the defendant had no notice that it would be re-
quired to rebut it.
Even so, the record is replete with reasons to conclude
that no warnings, regardless of form or content, would have
changed the unfortunate events that culminated in the
plaintiffs injury. An enumeration of the assumptions underly-
ing the inference bears this out:
(1) The inference of causation permitted by the court assumes that a
warning sold with the grinder would have remained affixed to the
product for thirty years and through an unknown succession of own-
ers, despite evidence that a warning label that was sold with the
product was not present at the time of the accident.
(2) The inference permitted by the court assumes that if a warning
was provided post-sale, it would have reached the then-current own-
er of the grinder, who would have affixed it to the grinder, even
"' See supra notes 52-69 and accompanying text.
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though that owner had maintained the guard intact and had no
intention of removing it.
(3) The inference assumes that if the warning had been affixed, and
if it had remained in place until plaintiffs employer obtained the
grinder, plaintiffs employer would have decided not to remove the
guard, even though no one knows who removed the guard or why,
and even though the guard was permanently attached and therefore
had to be forcibly removed.
(4) The inference assumes that if the warning had been affixed, and
had remained in place until plaintiff first came in contact with the
grinder and the guard had been removed, plaintiff would have un-
derstood the warning, recognized the absence of a guard, and re-
fused to work with the grinder until the guard was replaced, not-
withstanding that the plaintiff was seventeen, illiterate, poor, and
non-English-speaking, notwithstanding it was obvious that whatever
came in contact with the grinding mechanism was ground, notwith-
standing that he knew he should not let his hands go into the mouth
of the grinder, notwithstanding that he knew he should use a
"stomper" to prevent his hands from contact with the grinder but
did not, and notwithstanding that there was no easy way to reattach
the guard given the destroyed rivets and no evidence that the em-
ployer would be motivated to try.
In short, the meat grinder, from the user's perspective,
performed a simple function: whole meat went in one opening,
and ground meat came out another opening. A user oblivious
to the obvious danger posed by placing his hand in a meat
grinder would likely be equally oblivious to any warning to use
the grinder with a guard. The obviousness of the danger alone
should have negated any inference of causation.
Whether articulated as a "heeding presumption" or as an
"inference of causation," the Liriano III court's decision on re-
mand that the plaintiff could simply forego proof that a
warning about an obvious danger would have changed
someone's behavior and prevented his injury contravened sci-
ence, New York precedent, and common sense. To then impose
that outcome on the defendant without an opportunity to try
the case with full notice of both the theory and the presump-
tion, contravened fundamental fairness.
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CONCLUSION
As Henderson and Twerski conclude:
If this perception is accurate, and if we have fairly and persuasively
presented the shortcomings in current failure-to-warn doctrine,
perhaps courts will respond generally with good sense and modera-
tion .... It is imperative that failure-to-warn litigation become sub-
ject to the rule of law. Talk is cheap, but courts must recognize that
the education of consumers through product warnings is not. For too
long these easy cases have made bad law. The time for-change has
come.U
4
Unfortunately, the Liriano III decision represents a step in
the wrong direction, away from the good sense and moderation
urged by Henderson and Twerski. It is to be hoped that other
courts will not follow the Second Circuit's lead, and that future
panels take a new and more thoughtful look at the parameters
of the duty to warn.
15 Henderson & Twerski, supra note 69, at 326-27.
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